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1ABSTRACT
This qualitative study is an attempt to gain some 
insights into the level of corporate governance 
disclosure in New Zealand. A sample of ten 
large publicly-listed companies was analysed 
to determine to what extent they fulfil the 
requirements of the corporate governance 
principles and guidelines as recommended by 
the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) of New 
Zealand. Even though compliance with the FMA’s 
recommendations is voluntary, a high overall 
percentage of compliance (74%) was recorded in 
this study. This indicates the seriousness with 
which New Zealand companies take investor 
concerns on issues of corporate governance. The 
study found that a high compliance was recorded 
in areas such as board composition and board 
committees and low compliance recorded in 
areas involving costly implementation or when 
the issue is sensitive such as disclosures 
regarding remuneration details of directors and 
what non-audit work was undertaken and whether 
it compromises auditor independence. Being 
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a small country, New Zealand has performed 
well in attracting foreign investment due to its 
strong tradition of law enforcement and respect 
for regulations. With greater awareness of the 
importance of sound corporate governance to 
investors, companies may see the benefit of 
greater compliance with corporate governance 
guidelines.
INTRODUCTION
For the last decade, there has been an increasing 
focus on standards of corporate governance. 
In response to a series of corporate collapses 
that occurred in different parts of the world in 
the early part of the decade, the United Nations 
issued a guidance document on good practice 
in corporate governance disclosures for member 
states in May 2011. The aim is to strengthen 
their regulatory framework in order to restore 
investor confidence and enhance corporate 
transparency and accountability. In addition, in 
an attempt to lift poverty levels, the declaration 
of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals 
2in 2000, which were updated in 2015, has 
brought lasting governance changes to member 
countries. The global financial crisis of 2007-
2010 has once again brought into question 
the efficacy of corporate governance practices 
around the world. According to the OECD 
steering committee on corporate governance, the 
financial crisis could be attributed to failures and 
weaknesses in corporate governance practices 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). In this regard, researchers 
have questioned whether boards have the 
necessary skills, knowledge and understanding 
of the responsibilities relating to the businesses 
they are part of (Reddy & Locke, 2014); others 
argue that board failures are the result of a 
lack of shareholder monitoring (Icahn, 2009). 
However, there remains widespread concern as 
to why corporate governance systems failed so 
massively during the financial crisis.
The rationale for choosing New Zealand in 
my study is due to the fact that corporate 
governance has been a major concern for the 
economic success of the state. In New Zealand, 
the massive collapse of 50 finance companies 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008 resulted in huge losses to investors 
and was attributed largely to poor management 
and shortcomings in corporate governance 
practices (Peart, 2008). In addition, the NZ 
government’s bailout of finance companies, 
especially South Canterbury Finance, cost the 
taxpayers nearly two billion dollars – a massive 
amount for a small economy. Furthermore, the 
NZ government’s prosecution of many high 
profile directors (such as Sir Douglas Graham of 
Hanover Finance) brought corporate governance 
practices in the spotlight over the last decade. As 
a result, a powerful financial markets regulator, 
the Financial Markets Authority (FMA), was set 
up with wide powers to take action and made 
directors accountable for the decisions they 
make.
This study also highlights New Zealand’s unique 
corporate sector. Compared to the USA and the 
UK, New Zealand is a relatively small economy 
where the capital markets are not nearly so well-
developed. It involves a large number of firms 
with small market capitalisation and ownership 
concentration is extremely high (Reddy et al, 
2015). Consequently, corporate disciplining in 
the form of takeovers is comparatively weak 
in New Zealand. Moreover, performance-based 
compensation, such as stock option plans, is not 
as widespread among New Zealand firms. In fact, 
very few New Zealand firms use stock options 
to compensate their top managers (Boyle et al., 
2006; Roberts, 2007).
According to the FMA, the principles outlined in 
the New Zealand corporate governance guidelines 
contribute to high standards of corporate 
governance in New Zealand. In their handbook, 
the FMA considers that high standards are 
achieved when directors and boards implement 
the principles through their structures, 
processes and actions and demonstrate this in 
their public reporting and disclosure. In addition, 
there should be an organisation-wide culture to 
implement good practices seriously that starts 
from top management, and is not just a ‘tick-box 
exercise’.
The New Zealand corporate governance guidelines 
consist of nine principles for application within a 
broad range of entities. This study examines how 
principles 1 to 7 are reported by a carefully chosen 
sample of ten of the largest listed companies 
in New Zealand. These seven principles were 
chosen since they deal with how boards should 
govern and they form the basis of evaluating the 
standards of corporate governance reporting in 
New Zealand. The other two principles (8 and 9) 
were not included since they relate to shareholder 
relations and stakeholder interest that are not 
part of corporate governance practice. 
The New Zealand corporate governance 
guidelines recommend that boards provide 
sufficient meaningful information to show how 
they meet the nine high-level principles, and 
this study examines the seriousness of New 
Zealand’s largest companies in fulfilling those 
recommendations. The FMA reiterated that 
proper observance of New Zealand corporate 
governance guidelines is an important contributor 
to transparency and efficiency in the capital 
markets.
There has been little study of the level of 
compliance of New Zealand companies in meeting 
3the full extent of the New Zealand corporate 
governance guidelines. This study aims to 
ascertain the standard of corporate governance 
reporting in New Zealand, and to guage the ten 
companies’ attempts to meet the requirements 
stated in the seven stipulated principles. 
The study also aims to provide more insights 
into the standard of corporate governance in 
New Zealand. The study intends to uncover how 
a small country with a well-developed economy, a 
good system of law and order, good institutional 
set-ups and enforcement, implements the 
principles contained in the FMA’s corporate 
governance guidelines in practice.
The nine principles contained in the NZ corporate 
governance guidelines are:
1. Ethical standards – Directors should set high 
standards of ethical behaviour, model this 
behaviour and hold management accountable 
for delivering these standards throughout the 
organisation.
2. Board composition and performance – To 
ensure an effective board, there should be a 
balance of independence, skills, knowledge, 
experience and perspectives.
3. Board committees – The board should use 
committees where this will enhance its 
effectiveness in key areas while still retaining 
board responsibility.
4. Reporting and disclosure – The board should 
demand integrity in financial reporting and 
in the timeliness and balance of corporate 
disclosures.
5. Remuneration – The remuneration of directors 
and executives should be transparent, fair 
and reasonable.
6. Risk management – Directors should have a 
sound understanding of the key risks faced 
by the business and should regularly verify 
that there are appropriate processes in place 
to identify and manage these.
7. Auditors – The board should ensure the 
quality and independence of the external 
audit process.
8. Shareholder relations – The board should 
foster constructive relationships with 
shareholders that encourage them to engage 
with the entity.
9. Stakeholder interests – The board should 
respect the interests of stakeholders, taking 
into account the entity’s ownership type and 
its fundamental purpose. (FMA, 2014)
LITERATURE REVIEW
Importance of corporate governance
The importance of proper corporate governance 
cannot be emphasised enough. Both theoretical 
and empirical studies of corporate governance 
practices provide anecdotal (Ingley & McCaffrey, 
2009) and empirical evidence (Brown & Caylor, 
2006a and 2006b; Larcher et al, 2007; MacAvoy 
& Millstein, 2003) to support the view that good 
governance practices lead to improved financial 
performance. In addition, studies have shown 
that firms with weak shareholder protection 
could improve investor protection by increasing 
disclosure, selecting a more independent board, 
aligning incentives or imposing disciplinary 
mechanisms on management (Klapper & Love, 
2004; Ward et al, 2009).
A study by Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad (2014) 
concluded that the quality of corporate 
governance has been shown to affect a company 
financially in three ways: cost of capital, leverage 
and financing policy. This study showed that the 
cost of capital of firms with a high corporate 
governance score is significantly lower than those 
of firms with a low governance score. It also 
finds that firms with weak corporate governance 
mechanisms are more leveraged than firms 
with strong governance mechanisms. They 
also observed that firms with different levels of 
corporate governance standards adherence use 
different corporate governance mechanisms in 
relation to their financing policies.
The New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (NZICA, 2003) reported that 
institutional investors hold approximately 73 
per cent of the shares in New Zealand’s listed 
companies, and tend to be geographically 
dispersed; therefore, institutional investors 
in New Zealand are expected to demonstrate 
different investment strategy behaviour compared 
4to that observed in the UK and USA. For example, 
Chiu and Monin (2003) provide evidence of 
institutional investors picking New Zealand 
investments based on corporate governance 
characteristics such as having independent 
directors, separation of chair and CEO positions 
and performance-based remuneration for 
executives.
Appropriate corporate laws and regulations are 
vital for the efficient working of a capitalistic 
economy in order to maximise individual and 
national wealth. There is widespread belief 
that only strict laws and regulatory controls 
can prevent management acting for their 
own self-interest (Drobietz, 2002). Corporate 
governance regulations should lead to improved 
systems of internal control within companies. 
Leuz et al. (2003) examined systematic 
differences of earnings management and found 
a negative relationship between corporate 
governance regulations and the level of earnings 
management. Recent research has posited that 
firm performance and corporate governance are 
simultaneously determined by unobservable 
firm-specific factors (Coles et al, 2012; Wintoki 
et al, 2010; Hartzell et al, 2006).
Previous research also found that financial 
disclosure practices have a positive impact 
on investor confidence, reduce information 
asymmetry and result in a lower cost of capital 
(Francis et al, 2008). Similarly, corporate 
governance and other regulations help 
management to structure strong internal control 
systems and monitor shareholders’ interests. It 
has been found that adoption of self-regulation 
by market participants is the result of the growing 
conviction that better corporate governance will 
deliver higher shareholder value (Bartle & Vass, 
2007; Drobietz, 2002). 
Boards of governance, given their role in 
influencing key aspects of an organisation’s 
operations and culture, are attracting growing 
academic inquiry (Burke and Mattis, 2000; du 
Plessis et at, 2005; Kang et al, 2007). Much new 
interest has appeared following internationally 
prominent corporate scandals such as those 
of Enron and Parmalat. Boards of governance 
exercise powerful roles in decision-making at 
the highest level in corporate organisations. 
In addition to their established roles in setting 
organisational directions, performance targets, 
accountability to stakeholders and compliance 
with legal statutes, boards of governance play a 
central role in value creation and setting ethical 
norms of corporate behaviour (Clarke and Clegg, 
2000; Huse, 2007). Studies have shown that 
corporate governance may also affect overall 
economic performance at national level (Clarke 
and Clegg, 2000; Kang et al, 2007). 
The NZ Stock Exchange listing rules and the 
FMA’s corporate governance principles and 
guidelines both provide criteria with which 
listed companies should comply. The Financial 
Markets Authority expects that compliance with 
these criteria should result in better investor 
confidence. Research shows that firms with 
higher corporate governance compliance have 
reduced opportunistic management attitudes 
which ensure higher accountability and reporting 
quality (Aguilera, 2005; Sinha, 2006). A study 
by Bhuyian et al. (2013) found that corporate 
governance compliance increases management’s 
accountability and reduces financial discretion in 
decision-making.
Capital markets and corporate governance 
standards in New Zealand
The level of capital market development in a 
country has a profound effect on its standards 
of corporate governance. Even though New 
Zealand is a member of the OECD, its market 
characteristics are different from those of the 
US, for example, in its underdeveloped capital 
markets and small stock exchange (Koerniadi 
& Tourani-Rad, 2014). In comparison to larger 
markets such as the USA and UK, New Zealand’s 
economy has a lower degree of financial 
development, characterised by thin public capital 
markets and underdeveloped private capital 
and derivatives markets (report by the Capital 
Market Development Taskforce, 2009). Studies 
have shown that corporate governance practices 
in New Zealand are different to those in larger 
markets, particularly with respect to board 
structure (Aggarwal et al., 2009; Anderson & 
Gupta, 2009). In particular, New Zealand firms 
have relatively busier and less independent 
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2012). The mean multiple directorships held in 
New Zealand is around 2.4, which is significantly 
higher than the 1.23 average reported in the 
US (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). Also, 
on average, only about 59 per cent of board 
members in New Zealand firms are considered 
independent in contrast to more than 80 per 
cent in the US (Tonello and Torok, 2011). They 
also have a limited and small pool of director 
talent which tends to negatively impact on the 
role of the board as an effective governance 
mechanism. 
With a small and open financial market, New 
Zealand differs from large economies such as 
the UK and the USA. For example, CEOs in New 
Zealand tend to be closely connected to each 
other, therefore, the pay-performance relationship 
for New Zealand is found to be different from 
that reported for the UK and the USA. The 
available evidence in the literature suggests that 
institutional and blockholder ownership levels do 
not have the same positive effect in New Zealand 
as in other major markets. A study by Reddy 
et al. (2015) reveals that a high proportion of 
institutional and block shareholders is positively 
associated with CEO compensation and negatively 
associated with company performance in New 
Zealand, suggesting that it is not an effective 
mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation. 
The literature also suggests that foreign 
institutions and corporations collectively hold 
a majority (54%) of NZ company stock (Bhabra, 
2007). A 2009 report by the Capital Market 
Development (CMD) Taskforce Secretariat pointed 
out that a large share of the largest firms in NZ is 
controlled by offshore owners. A recent estimate 
by investment firm JBWere put foreign ownership 
at 36% of shares in NZ listed companies 
(JBWere, 2016). Foreign institutions have shown 
scant interest in imposing tighter oversight since 
a geographically-dispersed ownership pattern is 
not likely to generate significant incentives for 
effective monitoring (Al-Maskati et al., 2015). 
This is because foreign owners cannot generally 
justify the high cost of monitoring New Zealand 
companies when they own only a small proportion 
of shares. In fact, the popular press is replete 
with scathing criticism of institutions’ lack of 
shareholder activism in New Zealand (Reddy et 
al, 2015). However, a study by Koerniadi et al. 
(2014) into risk-taking behaviour concluded that 
geographically dispersed ownership does not 
lead to a problem of monitoring in New Zealand.
Another view takes the position that domestic 
institutions are unlikely to exert much influence 
on management due to other existing business 
relationships. Foreign institutional investors are 
unhindered by such ties and should therefore 
be more potent monitors of the firm’s risk-taking 
strategy (Nguyen, 2012).
Furthermore, unlike other major markets, there 
is no evidence in the literature to support 
the presence of a relationship between firm 
performance and the compensation of executives 
in NZ companies. Jiang (2009) suggests that 
concentrated ownership could explain this 
situation. On the other hand, New Zealand is 
significantly smaller than other major markets 
which accords greater transparency of managerial 
actions and the likelihood of collusion among 
outside board members given the concentration 
of most corporate headquarters in one major 
centre (Short and Keasey, 1999). 
Compared to other countries of the common 
law tradition, New Zealand has a low ratio of 
stock market capitalisation held by minority 
shareholders to gross national product (Capital 
Market Development Taskforce, 2009). There 
is high ownership concentration among New 
Zealand firms – only 30% of overall New Zealand 
firms can be classified as widely held (Al-Maskati 
et al., 2015). In addition, the corporate 
disciplining function of corporate takeovers is 
relatively weak in New Zealand. Compared to 
other OECD countries, such as the UK, the USA 
and Australia, the threat of takeovers is virtually 
non-existent in New Zealand as the market for 
corporate control is inactive (Hossain et al., 
2001). These factors imply that NZ is similar to 
other emerging markets rather than the UK, the 
USA and Australia (Koerniadi et al., 2014).
The New Zealand market provides a unique 
institutional setting since it is characterised 
by a high level of block ownership that does 
not necessarily reside with one category of 
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of outside directors and an inactive market for 
corporate control (Burton et al., 2013). As a 
result, internal governance mechanisms such 
as block ownership and board composition 
play a significant role in the nation’s corporate 
governance (Hossain et al., 2001).
In New Zealand, there is a tendency to favour a 
soft regulation strategy of equal opportunities, 
peer pressure and knowledge-sharing (Casey 
et al., 2011). Moreover, New Zealand corporate 
regulation is comparatively more flexible than in 
the USA where management is strictly monitored, 
controlled and penalised for wrong forecast and 
earnings engineering (Bhuyian et al., 2013). A 
study by Bhuyian et al. (2013) found evidence 
that the ‘comply or explain’ nature of soft 
regulation is effective in New Zealand and that it 
reduces managerial discretionary accruals.
As a developed economy, New Zealand has 
adopted the global best practices in corporate 
governance in line with regulations in the UK, 
USA and Australia (Koerniadi et al., 2014). In 
March 2004, the NZ Securities Commission, the 
predecessor to the FMA, published a handbook 
on principles and guidelines on corporate 
governance. Listed companies in New Zealand 
are subjected to the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
listing rules where they are required to adopt the 
FMA’s best practices on corporate governance 
(hereinafter referred to as NZ corporate 
governance guidelines). These principles set out 
standards of corporate governance that the FMA 
expects company boards to observe and to report 
on to their investors and other stakeholders. 
In contrast to USA’s act-based regulation, the 
New Zealand corporate governance guidelines 
are not mandatory. Therefore, listed companies 
have flexibility in reporting the stipulated best 
practices, and the FMA asks company boards 
to explain how they comply with each principle, 
in contrast to the ‘comply or explain why not’ 
requirement in Australia and the USA. 
Literature on board composition and 
independence
In most countries, the board of directors has 
an overriding duty to protect the interests of a 
firm’s shareholders. The board has the authority 
to hire, fire, monitor and compensate managers 
in achieving the objective of maximising 
shareholders’ wealth (Denis and McConnell, 
2003). However, when inside (executive) directors 
dominate the board, the extent to which the latter 
can effectively monitor and control management 
is questionable (Mak and Li, 2001). In this 
context, the inclusion of outside directors on 
corporate boards can be seen as a mechanism 
that mitigates agency conflict between managers 
and investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The 
presence of independent board members has 
in turn been linked to the effectiveness of the 
internal control system (Mace, 1971; Weisbach, 
1998). Outsider-dominated boards can play 
a strong monitoring role in companies with 
dispersed equity ownership. In such a firm, 
investors suffer from a collective-action problem 
and may not find it rewarding to monitor the 
performance of managers individually (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). Such a problem arises when 
investors only monitor a company’s performance 
individually – they do not normally unite to take 
action collectively.
However, the empirical research evidence 
regarding the effect board independence has on 
company performance has been inconclusive. 
Some researchers (e.g. Denis and Sarin, 1997; 
Hossain et al., 2001) find a positive relationship 
between board composition and company 
performance; while others (e.g. Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) find 
a negative relationship. Some studies (Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992; Chin et al., 2003) suggest there 
is no relationship between board composition 
and company performance. 
Studies have shown that internal managers 
have all the information about the company they 
manage and shareholders do not, thus leading 
to information asymmetry (Flannery, 1986). In 
contrast, board members appointed from outside 
the company bring expertise and knowledge 
that help to monitor managerial decisions and 
7also help to build networks to secure strategic 
resources required by companies (Fama and 
Jensen, 1978; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). A 
New Zealand study concluded that independent 
directors are an important mechanism for 
mitigating agency problems (Reddy & Locke, 
2014).
In this regard, the NZ Securities Commission 
(2004) recommended that the boards of publicly 
listed companies should have an independent 
chair, the majority of members should be non-
executive directors and a minimum of one-third 
of the members should be independent. In 
New Zealand, studies conducted by Hossain et 
al. (2001) and Reddy et al. (2008a) show that 
publicly listed companies do have a majority of 
independent directors on their boards. 
Findings from previous research indicate that 
discretionary accruals are affected by corporate 
governance factors such as the composition 
of the board of directors, CEO duality, the 
composition of the audit committee and auditor 
independence (Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 2007; Richardson 
et al., 2005; Siregar and Utama, 2008).
The results of empirical research suggest that 
outside directors are able to more effectively 
monitor and reduce agency costs, which results 
in lower discretionary accruals (Jiang, Lee and 
Anandarajan, 2008; Klein, 2002; Vance, 1983). 
Similarly, effective and independent board 
committees are expected to monitor internal 
control systems better. All of these attributes 
of best practice generally form part of a robust 
set of corporate governance regulations, so 
compliance with these regulations should 
strengthen corporate governance.
Theoretical underpinnings of the study
The incentives to provide corporate governance 
information voluntarily can be explained in terms 
of theories such as positive accounting theory 
(PAT), legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory 
(Deegan, 2000; Deegan & Gordon, 1996). In 
accordance with PAT, if company managers’ 
interests are aligned with shareholders’, 
corporate governance information will be 
disclosed if it brings benefits to the company. 
Corporate governance reporting provides 
companies with the opportunity to take advantage 
of increased transparency to capital markets, 
establish trustworthiness with stakeholders and 
to employ a valuable marketing tool (Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001). Disclosure 
of corporate governance information could be 
self-perpetuating in terms of maintaining and 
increasing company value through enhanced 
reputation, and disclosure influencing the 
external perception of reputation (Toms, 
2002). However, reluctance to report corporate 
governance information may arise from fear 
of both loss of competitive advantage and 
perhaps litigation (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). 
Companies may disclose corporate governance 
information to appear legitimate in the eyes of 
society and avoid the imposition of costs arising 
from non-legitimacy. The disclosure choices of 
comparable companies may shape legitimacy. 
Corporate governance disclosure may respond 
to the demands of the stakeholders most critical 
to the company’s ongoing survival. 
Corporate governance disclosure can be 
explained in terms of cost-benefit trade-off. The 
ethical branch of stakeholder theory appears 
to offer an alternative explanation. Companies 
recognise that different stakeholders have a 
right to corporate governance information and 
so disclosure is responsibility-driven. Disclosure 
of this nature is congruent with increasing firm 
value. Another proposition, in the context of 
capital structure decisions, is neutral mutation 
(suggested by Miller, 1977), whereby companies 
fall into disclosure patterns or habits which have 
no material effect on firm value.
Given these theoretical explanations, the 
disclosure of corporate governance information 
in annual reports is investigated in this study 
using content analysis. This type of investigation 
could potentially serve to measure the extent 
to which different categories of corporate 
governance information are disclosed, and to 
ascertain rates of compliance with the code of 
corporate governance.
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This study employs case-study analysis of large 
companies in order to ascertain how well New 
Zealand companies meet their obligations to 
report on corporate governance practices in their 
organisations. The content of company annual 
reports and publications on websites were 
analysed to determine whether the companies 
had met the disclosure standards laid out in 
New Zealand’s corporate governance guidelines. 
In recent years, content analysis has become 
a widely-used method of analysis in financial 
accounting research (Beattie, 2005). Several 
papers in accounting journals have discussed 
the use of content analysis to investigate 
accounting disclosures in the area of corporate 
social reporting (Hackson & Milne. 1996; Milne 
& Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000).
A qualitative method was used in this study 
because the issues under investigation are 
complex and multi-faceted. In deciding on 
the number of cases targeted for analysis, 
directions were suggested by a number of noted 
researchers on qualitative research. Eisenhardt 
(1989) suggests that cases should be added 
until “theoretical saturation” is reached, and 
that a range of between four and ten cases for 
any qualitative research is enough to generate 
theory with much complexity and for its empirical 
grounding to be convincing. Similarly, Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) recommend sampling selection “to 
the point of redundancy”. On the same issue, 
Hedges (1985) sets an upper limit of 12 because 
of the high cost involved in qualitative interviews 
and the quantity of qualitative data which can be 
effectively assimilated. In the same vein, Miles 
and Huberman (1994) suggest that more than 
15 cases make a study “unwieldy”. Perry (1998) 
suggests that the widest accepted range seems 
to fall between two to four as the minimum and 
15 as the maximum.
The objective of this paper is to find out to what 
extent large companies in New Zealand  comply 
with the principles and guidelines as stipulated 
by the FMA. To achieve this objective, a sample of 
ten large publicly-listed companies was selected 
from Kompass’s Business Profiles of New 
Zealand’s Top 100 Companies. The companies 
chosen were The Warehouse, Spark, Fletcher 
Building, Restaurant Brands, Ryman Health Care, 
Silver Fern Farms, Oceania Group NZ, Fisher & 
Paykel Healthcare, PGG Wrightson and Briscoe 
Group. To protect their anonymity, the companies 
are coded A to J in my analysis and shown in 
Appendix A.
To determine the degree of compliance of 
these companies, a list of 38 good practices 
were identified from the New Zealand corporate 
governance guidelines, and each practice was 
assigned one point for each compliance as 
disclosed by the company. These disclosures 
were gleaned from the companies’ annual 
reports and publications on their websites for a 
three-year period from 2014-2016. Information 
was obtained from a wide variety of sources – 
annual reports, company websites, investor 
centre, corporate governance statements, and 
charters of various board committees (e.g. those 
pertaining to audit, remuneration, nomination).
There are nine principles in the New Zealand 
corporate governance guidelines, but, as already 
stated, only seven were selected. Based on the 
seven chosen principles, the maximum score for 
a company is 38 as summarised below.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The analysis was based on a set of 38 criteria 
extracted from the New Zealand corporate 
governance guidelines. Each company was 
analysed against these criteria and the results 
are summarised in a table in Appendix A. 
Each of these criteria represents a point scored 
by a company if its disclosure meets the 
requirements of that criteria. The maximum score 
for a company is 38 and this represents all 38 
criteria being disclosed in accordance with the 
spirit of the NZ corporate governance guidelines. 
Results
None of the companies obtained the maximum 
score. The highest score was 35, the lowest was 
18, and the average was 28 points. The highest 
score meets 92% of the requirements of the 
New Zealand corporate governance guidelines 
and the lowest, 47%. On average, the companies 
in the analysis fulfil 74% of the requirements. 
9This indicates a high level of compliance with 
the spirit of New Zealand corporate governance 
guidelines. Such a high score is a positive sign 
of large publicly listed companies in New Zealand 
addressing investor concern with corporate 
governance in New Zealand.
Principle 1 (Ethical standards): The study 
found that most of the companies (8 out of 
10) had adopted a written code of ethics that 
is meaningful and in line with New Zealand 
corporate governance guidelines. This suggests 
that most New Zealand companies intend to 
uphold high ethical standards. However, none of 
the companies disclosed that they had obtained 
independent verification of the effectiveness of 
their implementation of the company’s code of 
ethics. This suggests that this requirement is 
Principle Number of good practice indicators
1 – Ethical standards 2
2 – Board composition and performance 10
3 – Board committees 14
4 – Reporting and disclosure 3
5 – Remuneration 4
6 – Risk management 2
7 – Auditors 3
Total 38
Table 1: NZ corporate governance principles and the number of good practices indicators
Number Company’s name Number of 
directors
Sales / Revenue 
($million)
Total assets 
($million)
Market 
capitalisation 
($million)
1 The Warehouse 8 2,945 1,243 726
2 Spark NZ 8 3,497 3,237 7,191
3 Fletcher Building 8 9,004 7,267 5,526
4 Restaurant Brands 8 497 302 798
5 Ryman Healthcare 8 614 4,944 4,630
6 Silver Fern Farms 8 2,309 541 60
7 Oceania Group 5 232 918 641
8 Fisher & Paykel 
Healthcare
8 894 878 6,355
9 PGG Wrightson 7 1,182 687 453
10 Briscoe Group 5 583 298 878
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of companies analysed
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difficult to comply with since it would be costly 
for the companies to get an outside expert to 
conduct the work. Ethical standards as suggested 
in the literature are high, but the findings in 
this study showed a lack of ethical oversight in 
setting these high standards of ethical behaviour. 
Implementation of ethics in an organisation rests 
on its culture and its management’s commitment 
to ethical corporate behaviour.
Principle 2 (Board composition and performance): 
The study found, in all cases, that the chairperson 
of the board was not holding the CEO position. The 
New Zealand corporate governance guidelines 
discourages CEO duality since it can lead to 
unfettered powers in the hands of one person 
opening up the possibility for abuse of power and 
misuse of funds. Similarly, 100% compliance 
(all 10 compnies) was recorded for reporting 
information on director profiles of experience, 
length of service, independence status and 
ownership interests. Moreover, it was found that 
all the companies examined followed the New 
Zealand corporate governance guidelines in 
having a majority of non-executives on the board 
of directors and ensured that a minimum of one-
third of them are independent. In addition, it was 
found that only 10% of the companies (one out of 
ten) did not establish clear criteria for identifying 
any independent directors or ensuring that the 
Chairperson of the board is independent.
This study found that a high majority (9 out of 10) 
of the companies displayed a formal charter that 
set out board responsibilities and roles. On the 
other hand, only 70% of the companies (7 out of 
10) provide information on board appointments, 
training and evaluation processes. A similar 
percentage was recorded for companies 
enabling directors to seek independent advice 
at the company’s expense. In most cases, 
directors need to seek permission from the 
chairperson of the board to do so. Alarmingly, 
the study found that only half of the cases report 
on board composition and succession planning 
on an annual basis. This is a relatively low level 
of compliance even though such information is 
important for investors.
Principle 3 (Board committees): The study found 
that all 10 companies have established an audit 
committee and ensured that at least one director 
is a qualified accountant or has equivalent 
expertise. Also, in all cases, the chairperson of 
the audit committee is an independent director 
and not the chair of the board. This is in the 
spirit of the New Zealand corporate governance 
guidelines as it safeguards the independence of 
the audit committee to carry out its important 
work on behalf of shareholders. Ideally, the 
audit committee should be composed wholly 
of non-executive directors with a majority being 
independent. In this study only one company was 
found to be lacking in this aspect of corporate 
governance.
The study also found that all the companies 
examined had established a remuneration 
committee and ensured that it was composed 
of independent directors. The remuneration 
committee must be seen to be independent of 
the executive management team to be able to 
recommend fair remuneration to all. However, 
only 60% of the companies (6 out of 10) publish 
policies and procedures relating to remuneration. 
This showed the sensitivity of the issue of 
remuneration and reluctance of management to 
disclose it publicly.
A high majority of the companies examined (8 out 
of 10) publish details of directors’ attendance at 
board and committee meetings. The study also 
found that companies place high importance on 
risk management with 8 out of 10 companies 
having established a risk committee. However, low 
compliance was recorded for the establishment 
of health and safety committees (4 out of 10) 
and corporate governance committees (3 out 
of 10). In their annual report, some companies 
explained that they do not establish these 
committees because issues of health, safety 
and corporate governance are usually discussed 
in full board meetings.
Principle 4 (Reporting and disclosure): The study 
found that 70% of the companies (7 out of 10) 
examined have a written internal process for 
compliance with continuous disclosure regimes. 
An unexpected finding here is that only 2 out 
of 10 companies had established a disclosure 
committee. This is probably because issues of 
disclosure are normally discussed by an audit 
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committee or in a full board meeting. It was 
found that only 6 out of 10 companies examined 
have met the NZ guidelines to publish details of 
the corporate governance structures, systems of 
control, processes and actions on their websites. 
These are pertinent issues for investors.
Principle 5 (Remuneration): The study found that 
all companies complied with the New Zealand 
corporate governance guidelines on disclosure 
of total remuneration with a full breakdown of any 
benefits and incentives paid to directors. This is 
also in line with the legal requirements under the 
Companies Act. However, only 8 of the 10 cases 
examined clearly differentiated the remuneration 
of executive from non-executive directors. 
Furthermore, only half of these companies 
disclosed executive remuneration packages 
that included an element geared on entity and 
individual performance. Due most likely to the 
sensitivity of the issue of remuneration, only 5 of 
10 companies publish remuneration policies on 
their websites or in annual reports despite being 
required to do so in the FMA guidlines.
Principle 6 (Risk management): The study 
found that 70% of these companies (7 out of 
10) reported annually on risk identification, risk 
management and internal controls. Despite the 
importance of sound risk management to the 
companies’ futures, only 6 out of 10 companies 
report annually on strategies to manage 
significant risk. This is a significant finding as it 
indicates that 4 out of 10 companies may not 
have the necessary skills to manage potential 
risk. This could be disastrous given the aftermath 
of the recent earthquakes in Christchurch and 
Kaikoura where many companies were caught 
without a business continuity plan.
Principle 7 (Auditors): The study found that 80% 
of the companies (8 out of 10) explained how they 
demonstrated auditor quality and effectiveness, 
and their boards’ approaches to auditor tenure 
and re-appointment. The same percentage also 
disclosed all fees paid to auditors with any 
non-audit work separately identified. Despite 
the importance of auditor independence, only 3 
out of 10 companies explained in their annual 
report what non-audit work was undertaken, and 
why this did not compromise auditor objectivity 
and independence. This finding suggests that 
companies are happy to report on the quality 
of external audits, and to disclose fees paid to 
auditors, but are reluctant to report on matters 
that are sensitive to management and external 
auditors, perhaps because it is thought to 
compromise auditor independence. On the other 
hand, such information is relevant to shareholders 
who may question if the audit report is reliable.
Overall, analysis of the annual reports and other 
publications for the three-year period (2014-
2016) reveal a gradual improvement towards 
greater disclosure as companies attempt to 
comply with the revised corporate governance 
guidelines issued by the FMA in December 2014. 
The results of this analysis are a reflection of the 
companies’ efforts to comply with the revised 
guidelines as shown by the relatively high level 
of compliance to the principles contained in 
the current New Zealand guidelines. Compared 
to other OECD countries such as the UK and 
Australia, it seems New Zealand companies 
are more responsive and more willing to fulfil 
their corporate governance obligations. This is 
because the results show a concerted effort 
towards full disclosure and companies were quick 
to at least partially adopt the new guidelines as 
soon as they were made available.
CONCLUSION
The study gave some significant insights into the 
level of corporate governance disclosures in New 
Zealand. The companies examined are large, 
high-profile entities that are constantly under 
public scrutiny and whose shares are widely held 
by New Zealand and overseas investors. 
Overall, the study found that there is a high level 
of voluntary compliance with the requirements of 
New Zealand corporate governance guidelines, 
on average 74%, among the ten companies 
studied. This indicates how serious the efforts of 
these companies have been to attract and retain 
investors in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis. Being a small economy, New Zealand 
has done well to attract foreign investment in a 
challenging environment. This is partly due to the 
country’s reputation for having a tradition of strong 
law enforcement and respect for regulations. 
12
The study found that high compliance with 
New Zealand corporate governance guidelines 
was recorded on basic corporate governance 
structures and especially where there is similar 
requirement in the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
listing rules; for example, 100% compliance 
was recorded for the establishment of an audit 
committee. From the study, it was found that 
low compliance is recorded when it involves 
significant cost to implement, or when the 
issue is sensitive such as disclosures regarding 
remuneration details and what non-audit work 
was undertaken and whether it compromises 
auditor integrity and independence. In addition, 
a low compliance was recorded for reporting on 
succession planning on an annual basis. This 
signifies a difficulty in getting new talent in a 
small country to succeed in top management. 
Since the New Zealand corporate governance 
guidelines are non-mandatory, many companies 
choose to ignore some of the recommendations. 
The New Zealand guidelines recommend that 
companies explain why a principle is not complied 
with, but only one company actually took the 
trouble to explain why it did not meet one of the 
recommendations.
The companies may lack the technical expertise 
to understand all the recommendations in the 
NZ corporate governance guidelines or it could 
be a case of not appreciating the importance 
of these guidelines to investors. In some 
cases, the companies may believe that further 
disclosure would not add value to its share price 
especially if it is costly to provide the information 
as prescribed in the guidelines. Unless there is 
investor activism to demand greater compliance 
with the New Zealand corporate governance 
guidelines, the standard of disclosure will probably 
not improve. However, in the light of the global 
financial crisis and political uncertainties brought 
about by a sweeping change of protectionist 
policies in America and ‘Brexit’ in Europe, there 
is a possibility that greater awareness of the 
importance of sound corporate governance may 
compel companies to comply with more of the 
disclosure requirements in the New Zealand 
corporate governance principles and guidelines. 
The findings of this study suggest that companies 
try to serve stakeholders in New Zealand well 
by providing corporate governance information 
relevant for decision making; and understand 
that, because their continued existences are 
contingent on the support of their stakeholders, 
a firm’s management will engage in and report 
on activities that are expected by stakeholders. 
In terms of corporate governance disclosures, 
stakeholder theory suggests that businesses 
will ‘elect’ to voluntarily disclose information on 
corporate governance, social and environmental 
performance over and above mandatory 
requirements in order to appease and manage 
their stakeholders (Tom, 2002). This is in line with 
the positive accounting theory which postulates 
that corporate governance information will be 
disclosed if it brings benefits to the company 
(Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Since corporate 
governance reporting can increase company’s 
transparency and enhanced its reputation, this 
can lead to higher share values.
LIMITATION OF STUDY
The sample size of this study is small and so 
it could not make any statistical generalisations 
from the 10 companies selected for the sample. 
However, some indications on the standards of 
corporate governance in New Zealand can be 
observed from the level of compliance found 
in this study, and these may reveal productive 
avenues for future research. In this study, I had 
adopted a content-analysis approach to derive 
a line of argument and draw conclusions. In 
this way, this study’s methodology contrasts 
with Eisenhardt’s (1989) study that employs 
interviews to draw theoretical conclusions.
Disclosure requirements in the New Zealand 
corporate governance principles are intended 
as a guide for companies so they can fulfil their 
obligations as good corporate citizens and ideally 
provide evidence that there are good corporate 
governance mechanisms in place. However, 
in practice, the mechanism may not work well 
and may depend on the organisation’s culture 
and willingness to implement the guidelines in 
spirit. The focus of the organisation may be to 
disclose the existence of such mechanisms with 
no regard to their effectiveness. In this regard, 
it is accepted that a company’s compliance and 
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adherence to the guidelines do not necessarily 
result in higher-quality practices. Indeed, having a 
written code of ethics displayed on the company’s 
website does not necessarily guarantee that a 
company will uphold high ethical standards.
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APPENDIX A
Results of analysis of company’s compliance of New Zealand corporate governance guidelines
Principle 1: Ethical standards
Company A B C D E F G H I J Compliance 
percentage
Adoption of a written code of 
ethics?
Yes Yes 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0 80%
Any independent verification of 
the code’s implementation?
No No No No No No No No No No 0%
Principle 2: Board composition and performance
Company A B C D E F G H I J Compliance 
percentage
A formal charter that sets 
out board roles?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 90%
Chairperson separate from 
CEO?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100%
Chairperson is 
independent?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0 90%
Reports information on 
director’s experience, 
length of service, 
ownership, independence?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100%
Information on board’s 
appointment, training and 
evaluation process?
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
70%
Reports on composition 
and succession planning 
annually?
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
60%
Publishes clear criteria 
for defining independent 
directors?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
90%
A majority of non-
executives on the board?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100%
A minimum of one-third of 
directors on the board are 
independent?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100%
Directors entitled to seek 
independent advice?
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No
60%
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Principle 3: Board committees
Company A B C D E F G H I J Compliance 
percentage
Presence of a nomination 
committee?
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 70%
Committee’s charter and 
membership published on 
website or annual reports?
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
60%
Established an audit 
committee?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100%
Audit committee consists 
entirely of non-executives and a 
majority are independent?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
80%
Audit committee consists of 
at least one director who is a 
qualified accountant?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100%
Audit committee consists 
of a chairperson who is 
independent?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100%
Chair of audit committee not 
chairperson of board?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100%
Is a remuneration committee 
established?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
90%
Remuneration committee 
consists of a majority of 
independent directors?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
90%
Publishes policies and 
procedures relating to 
remuneration?
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
60%
Presence of a risk committee? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 80%
Presence of health and safety 
committee?
No Yes 0 Yes 0 Yes Yes No No No 40%
Existence of a corporate 
governance committee?
Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No
30%
Publishes details of directors’ 
attendance at board and 
committee meetings?
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
80%
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Principle 4: Reporting and disclosure
Company A B C D E F G H I J Compliance 
percentage
Is there a written internal 
process for compliance with 
acontinuous disclosure regime?
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 70%
Corporate governance 
structures and systems of 
control published on entity’s 
website?
Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 60%
Existence of adisclosure 
committee?
Yes No No No No No No Yes No No 20%
Principle 5: Remuneration
Company A B C D E F G H I J Compliance 
percentage
Publishes remuneration policies 
on website or in an annual 
report? Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 50%
Executive remuneration clearly 
differentiated from that of 
non-executive directors? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 80%
Do executive remuneration 
packages include an element 
dependent on entity and 
individual performance?
Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 50%
Disclosure made of total 
remuneration with full 
breakdown of any benefits paid 
to directors?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 100%
Principle 6: Risk management
Company A B C D E F G H I J Compliance 
percentage
Reports annually on risk 
identification, risk management 
and internal controls?
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 70%
Reports annually on risk 
management strategy?
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 60%
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Principle 7: Auditors
Company A B C D E F G H I J Compliance 
percentage
Explains in annual report 
what non-audit work was 
undertaken and why this 
did not compromise auditor 
independence?
Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No 30%
Explains how the board satisfies 
themselves of auditor quality, 
approach to auditor’s tenure 
and reappointment?
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 80%
Discloses all fees paid to 
auditors with various types 
of non-audit work separately 
identified?
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 80%
Total score 34 25 23 33 33 25 35 19 33 18
Points Percentage of compliance
Summary Highest score 35 92%
Lowest score 18 47%
Average 28 74%
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